The Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction for illegal reentry after removal because the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in the removal proceedings. The counsel had conceded removability for conviction of a drug trafficking aggravated felony where the immigrant had a Missouri conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. As in Moncrieffe, the conviction (Missouri Revised Statutes § 195.211) encompassed distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, which would not be a felony under the federal Controlled Substance Act and thus not an aggravated felony as the state equivalent of a felony conviction under the Controlled Substance Act. Moncrieffe had not been decided at the time of the attorney’s concession, but a circuit split did exist at the time and the Seventh Circuit (in which the removal proceedings occurred) had not ruled on the issue at the time.
The Board of Immigration Appeals applied the Supreme Court’s decisions in Descamps and Moncrieffe to find that the respondent’s felony conviction under section 76-10-508.1 of the Utah Code for discharge of a firearm was not an aggravated felony crime of violence, but was a deportable firearms offense.
Section 76-10-508.1(1) has three subsections and it was not clear which the respondent was convicted of. The first, subsection (a), penalizes one who “discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered by the discharge of the firearm.” This does not require any particular mental state by the person who discharges the firearm, which means under the Utah Code that it may be done with intent, knowledge, or recklessness.
The Supreme Court held in Leocal that the mental state of recklessness does not satisfy the federal definition of a crime of violence, so the Board held that a violation of section 76-10-508.1(1)(a) is not necessarily an aggravated felony crime of violence. Further, the Board held it could not find the respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony under the modified categorical approach. It determined it could not use the modified categorical approach because the mental states for subsection (a) (intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly) are not divisible because they are not elements of the offense that a jury must unanimously agree upon. In other words, a jury returning a guilty verdict could do so where some members of the jury believe the defendant acted intentionally, while others believe he acted recklessly. Since the offense does not necessarily constitute a crime of violence and it is not divisible, no conviction for section 76-10-508.1(1)(a) would be an aggravated felony crime of violence.
The Board nonetheless found that Chairez-Castrejon was convicted of a firearms offense because it rejected his argument on the antique firearm exception. The federal definition of a firearm excludes certain antique firearms, while the respondent argued that Utah law did not. The Board noted that there was no specific exception for antique firearms under Utah law, but also found that the respondent had not shown Utah actually prosecutes offenses involving antique firearms. In Moncrieffe, the Supreme Court held that an alien who invokes this “antique firearm” argument in order to defeat an aggravated felony charge “would have to demonstrate
that the State actually prosecutes the relevant offense in cases involving antique firearms.” The respondent apparently could not show that here (California, on the other hand, does prosecute cases involving antique firearms). The Board therefore found Chairez-Castrejon deportable, although it remanded for consideration of his cancellation of removal claim because it found his conviction was not an aggravated felony.
In yet another positive development in the State of California, the maximum potential sentence to imprisonment for misdemeanors is now 364 days. It accomplishes this by adding section 18.5 to the Penal Code, which provides:
Every offense which is prescribed by any law of the state to be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail up to or not exceeding one year shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed 364 days.
Governor Brown signed the bill, SB 1310, on July 21, 2014. Since the text of the bill does not specify otherwise, criminal defense attorneys should assume that the change does not go into effect until January 1, 2015. Until then, attorneys should pursue other strategies to protect their clients.
There are three major benefits for non-citizens convicted of a misdemeanor that carries a 364 day maximum potential sentence. First, the conviction could not meet the federal definition of an aggravated felony based on a 365 day sentence to imprisonment (be careful, though, because some aggravated felonies do not require any sentence to imprisonment).
Second, a California misdemeanor conviction would no longer make an immigrant deportable for conviction of a single crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) committed within 5 years of admission, since that ground of deportability only applies if the conviction carries a maximum potential sentence to imprisonment of one year or more.
Third, a single misdemeanor CIMT conviction that results in a sentence to imprisonment of 6 months or less would no longer automatically disqualify a non-permanent resident from cancellation of removal. Cancellation of removal is discretionary relief from removal based on continuous physical presence of 10 or more years and exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a citizen or permanent resident family member.
In this illegal reentry case, a Ninth Circuit panel held that battery on a peace officer that causes injury in violation of California Penal Code (CPC) section 242/243(c)(2) is categorically a crime of violence under the sentencing equivalent of the definition at 18 U.S.C. 16(a) (effectively tripling the prison exposure). It found CPC 243(c)(2) requires as an element the willful use of force against the person of another sufficient to cause injury. It notes a California Court of Appeal decision that equates willful with intentional and thus concludes that a battery willfully inflicted that causes injury is a crime of violence.
Seems reasonable at first glance, except the court glosses over a lot in a way one wouldn’t expect for a published decision. First, the willfulness that the court makes a big deal about is located in the definitional statute at 242. That willfulness is just the general intent to effect a simple battery. A simple battery can include any form of unlawful touching–even a push that causes no injury. And the Ninth Circuit has previously held that a simple battery with that type of intent is not a crime of violence. Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2006) (simple battery against a domestic victim is not a crime of violence for purposes of the domestic violence ground of deportability).
It is the resulting injury that triggers the enhanced sentence at 243(c)(2), and the injury need not be intentional. Thus, pushing a peace officer would be punishable under CPC 243(b) (misdemeanor) if it causes no injury, while the same push with the same level of force would be punishable under CPC 243(c)(2) (felony or misdemeanor) if it causes the cop to trip over something and he needs an ice pack (we are not talking great bodily injury, or GBI, here). Either way, it does not matter what the defendant intended because there is no element of specific intent to cause injury, just the general intent to complete the contact.
This is why the court’s reliance on United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2010) is way off base. Laurico-Yeno concerned CPC 273.5, which penalizes a person who “willfully inflicts upon [a protected domestic victim] corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition.” There, unlike CPC 242/243(c)(2), the injury is willfully inflicted.
It gets worse, though. The California Court of Appeals opinion that the panel cites for support actually undermines its position. The discussion of willfulness in People v. Lewis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 891, 901 (CA 4 2004) first notes, “Usually the word “willfully” defines a general intent crime unless the statutory language requires an intent to do some further act or achieve some future consequence.” Therefore, “When the structure of a section requires a willful act followed by some particular result, then it is reasonable to read the willful, i.e., intentional, element as referring only to the initial act and not to the ultimate result. In such sections the word “willfully” does not require the defendant intend the ultimate result, only that he or she intended the initial act.” That is precisely why a simple battery that results in injury (that need not be intended) does not comport with the Supreme Court’s holding in Leocal that a crime of violence must actually be violent.
Let’s hope there is a request for en banc rehearing to reconcile this case with Ortega-Mendez and with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.
The Ninth Circuit held that aggravated assault in violation of Arizona Revised Statute 13-1203 is not categorically a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 16(a) because it encompasses reckless conduct in addition to knowing or intentional conduct. A mens rea of mere recklessness is not enough–the Ninth Circuit has held that at least extreme recklessness is required. Applying the modified categorical analysis, however, the court found the defendant pleaded guilty to charges that alleged only intentionally placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury. It thus was a crime of violence.
Since the defendant received a 12 month sentence for this crime of violence conviction, the court held it was an aggravated felony. This aggravated felony conviction precluded voluntary departure in the removal proceedings that followed, so the defendant was not prejudiced when the immigration judge did not advise him about voluntary departure. The court therefore found he could not collaterally attack the removal order and upheld his conviction for a subsequent attempted illegal reentry with a sentence of 70 months.